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THE FIRST AMENDMENT . . . UNITED 
Joel M. Gora* 
INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps the most important thing that the Supreme Court does is to 
protect those individual rights and enforce those government limits 
that comprise our civil liberties. The Supreme Court did precisely 
that in its 2010 decision, very controversial in many quarters, in 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.1 Despite all of the 
sturm and drang associated with the case, to my mind, this was 
basically a very simple case. Maybe I am just being simple-minded, 
but the First Amendment to the Constitution says that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech; or of the 
press . . . .” In the McCain-Feingold law of 2002, more formally 
known as the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA),2 
Congress had done precisely that, by prohibiting all corporations and 
all labor unions from broadcasting advertisements near an election 
that merely name a federal candidate. And the Court’s duty—its 
painful duty, as it said in McCulloch v. Maryland3—was to say no, 
the Constitution does not let you do that. In doing so, the Court 
steered the First Amendment ship back to its proper path of deterring 
and disallowing government restrictions on political speech and did 
so for the proper reasons. And in telling Congress it had acted 
improperly, the Court discharged its historic obligations going back, 
of course, to Marbury v. Madison,4 to declare Acts of Congress 
inconsistent with the Constitution to be not the law of the land, i.e., to 
be “unconstitutional.” 
                                                                                                                 
 * Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I want to thank President Joan Wexler and Dean 
Michael Gerber and the Brooklyn Law School Dean’s Summer Research Stipend Program for 
supporting this article. In the interests of full disclosure, I should note that I was one of the lawyers 
challenging the campaign finance restrictions on First Amendment grounds in both Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1 (1976), and Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 1. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 2. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, §§ 203–204, 116 Stat. 81.  
 3. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819). 
 4. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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Not everyone agrees that the Court got it right in the Citizens 
United case and properly exercised its power of judicial review. 
Indeed the reaction to the opinion has been incredibly intemperate in 
so many quarters. And, unlike few Supreme Court decisions in recent 
years, it not only influenced the conduct of the 2010 elections, but it 
was an issue in them. So the case for the decision’s correctness will 
require somewhat more detail.  
Here is one narrative about the case. Corporations are stealing our 
democracy. There has been an avalanche of secret corporate money, 
most of it coming from those sneaky foreigners, trying to buy our 
elections. This has been made possible solely by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Citizens United, where a cabal of five right-wing Justices, 
in a calculated fit of judicial activism, distorted and twisted the law to 
hand the 2010 elections to the right wingers and the Tea Partiers. 
Why, it feels like Bush v. Gore5 all over again. Had it not been for the 
Supreme Court’s hideous decision—maybe the worst decision since 
Dred Scott6—the Democrats would have retained their huge 
majorities in Congress and the states and President Obama would 
have continued to have the enormous popularity he so rightfully 
deserves. All because of the Supreme Court decision in Citizens 
United. Indeed, they ought to be impeached and replaced by Justices 
who will be properly deferential to the wisdom and expertise of our 
elected officials, especially when they are writing the rules governing 
whether they will stay in power. If you read the New York Times, or 
listened to NPR or watched MSNBC, or took your cue from President 
Barack Obama and former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, that is the 
story you probably heard.7 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 6. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
 7. Speaking of cues, there reached a point where the coordinated narrative pattern became so 
obvious that it almost took on the aspects of an orchestrated campaign. A left-wing group would make 
the charge that they had discovered evidence that corporate money or foreign money or foreign 
corporate money was secretly overwhelming the election, the press would pick up the charge and give it 
credence, even though it was overstated at best and dishonest at worst, and then Democratic party 
leaders would trumpet the charge as evidence that the evils unleashed by the Supreme Court ruling were, 
as predicted, overwhelming us. The false claim that the Chamber of Commerce was using vast amounts 
of foreign corporate money to do so was a prime example. See Jeff Patch, Guilty Until Proven Innocent, 
CENTER FOR COMPETITIVE POL. BLOG, Oct. 7, 2010, http://www.campaignfreedom.org/blog/detail/ 
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There is a different narrative about Citizens United. It goes 
something like this. Congress passed a law which made it a crime for 
a group of individuals (who formed a corporation) to broadcast a 
movie or even advertisements of a movie which was highly critical of 
the leading candidate for President of the United States. When the 
group took their case to the Supreme Court, not only did the 
government defend that law, but the government also argued that 
Congress could pass a law making it a crime for a group of people 
like that even to publish a book that was highly critical of a leading 
candidate for President of the United States, or even of the President 
himself during an election season. Under this narrative, and given no 
more than the text of the First Amendment to guide us, it is almost 
the constitutional equivalent of res ipsa loquitur to conclude that the 
laws in question cannot stand and that the Court had a duty to call out 
the Congress for passing such a law. If you read the Wall Street 
Journal, or listen to Rush Limbaugh, or watch Fox News Channel, or 
take your cue from Senator Mitch McConnell, that’s the story you 
heard.  
In my view, the truth is not somewhere in between. Maybe it is 
because of my own personal narrative with these issues. 
                                                                                                                 
guilty-until-proven-innocent (describing circulation and coverage of claim). Indeed when the meme, as 
they say, reached a frantic peak, I was not surprised to see, prominently displayed in the New York 
Times’ Week in Review, a picture of Richard Nixon, the ultimate liberal bogeyman, a reference to 
Watergate, and the suggestion that the campaign funding that the Supreme Court had so wrongly 
unleashed was at least as bad as that, if not worse. See Jill Abramson, Return of the Secret Donors, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 17, 2010, at WK1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/17/weekinreview/ 
17abramson.html. So much of this was teed off by the President’s false State of the Union charge that 
the Court’s decision had opened the “floodgates” for foreign money to dominate our elections. But even 
the New York Times was moved finally to call the President out for his gross exaggerations of the role of 
foreign money in the elections. See Eric Lichtblau, Topic of Foreign Money in U.S. Races Hits Hustings, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2010, at A14 (responding to the President’s claim that “‘groups that receive foreign 
money are spending huge sums to influence American elections,’” (citing President Obama) by noting 
that: “a closer examination shows that there is little evidence that what the chamber does in collecting 
overseas dues is improper or even unusual, according to both liberal and conservative election-law 
lawyers and campaign finance documents”).  
3
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I.  THE ARC OF HISTORY: FROM BUCKLEY TO CITIZENS UNITED 
My own personal odyssey in dealing with the clash between 
campaign finance laws and First Amendment limitations goes back 
almost forty years to when I was a young ACLU lawyer and 
Congress enacted the Federal Election Campaign Act,8 which 
supplies the basic structure of federal election campaign law today. In 
1972, before the ink had even been dry on the brand new law, 
President Richard Nixon’s Department of Justice brought the very 
first lawsuit under the Act against a small group of left-wing 
dissenters who had paid for a two-page ad in the New York Times 
calling for President Nixon’s impeachment for his conduct of the war 
in Cambodia.9 The government’s legal theory was that it was an 
election year, the ad was critical of President Nixon, up for re-
election, therefore, the money was spent for the purpose of 
influencing the outcome of the election and was punishable under the 
new law—a theory that the Court would resoundingly reject in the 
famous case of Buckley v. Valeo10 a few years later. If that situation 
sounds like déjà vu all over again, with the Citizens United case 
involving a small group of right-wing dissenters who put out a 
movie/DVD critical of presidential candidate Hillary Clinton during 
an election year, it is. The Nixon impeachment ad was the classic 
example of the clash between campaign finance controls and free 
speech principles, a clash which almost four decades of court 
decisions, legislative revisions, and bureaucratic regulations have not 
abated, and indeed have made more acute. And the Hillary: The 
Movie case involved the same clash over the government’s control of 
political speech. 
Responding to the Nixon case started us at the ACLU down the 
path of resisting any restrictions on the funding of political speech, on 
the theory that no such restrictions were consistent with the central 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).  
 9. United States v. Nat’l Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1972); ACLU v. 
Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C 1973) (three-judge court), vacated as moot sub nom, Staats v. 
ACLU, 422 U.S. 1030 (1975). 
 10. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
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meaning of the First Amendment: that it protects unrestrained and 
uninhibited discussion and criticism, from as many sources as 
possible, of government and the officials who run it or seek to run it. 
It slowly dawned on us, like the prisoner in Kafka’s Penal Colony, 
that campaign finance limitations posed ferocious First Amendment 
problems, that they restrained criticism of government and 
entrenched incumbents and the forces of the status quo, and that 
restraints on independent speech are particularly objectionable; 
indeed, they so cut against First Amendment values that they are the 
Achilles’ heel of campaign finance regulation. All these implications 
raised our consciousness, as we used to say, about how fraught with 
First Amendment perils the campaign finance laws were and are.  
The arc that connects the Nixon impeachment ad case and the 
Hillary: The Movie case is the view that where political speech and 
association is concerned, First Amendment rights should be unified, 
universal, and indivisible. And that is precisely the theory that ruled 
the day in the Citizens United case. The decision was a great victory 
for the theory of the First Amendment long espoused by critics of 
campaign finance controls, and it almost seemed the Court was 
channeling the kinds of criticisms of the campaign finance laws and 
their enforcement that the Buckley plaintiffs had asserted way back 
then.  
For the essence of the Citizens United decision rested on the 
following fundamental principles. Political speech is essential to an 
effective democracy. The more political speech you have the better 
democracy you will have. Campaign finance limitations necessarily 
and inherently involve controls on political speech. Government 
cannot be trusted not to rig those rules and set those controls to 
protect incumbents and the status quo. This danger requires courts to 
give a skeptical strict scrutiny to campaign finance laws. The 
campaign finance regulatory regime has become so complex and 
convoluted that it is tantamount to a de facto system of prior restraint, 
as well to a “caste system” with privileged speakers and pariah 
speakers which is anathema to First Amendment rights which have to 
be universal and indivisible. In one way or another, these themes that 
civil libertarian critics of the campaign finance system have sounded 
5
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over the years were embedded into the Court’s analysis more than 
any time since Buckley.  
In Citizens United the Court was willing to use broad strokes to 
strike down a law that restricted speech in broad terms. Under the 
challenged law, all corporations and all labor unions were banned, 
under threat of criminal sanctions, from using their funds to speak out 
about government and politics in any way that even mentioned a 
politician or an incumbent officeholder running for election. What 
could be more quintessentially at the core of the First Amendment 
than such speech, and what more important role could the Court play 
than striking down a law that restrained such speech? The First 
Amendment has always been based on the idea that the more speech 
we have, the better off we are, as individuals and as a people. The 
Citizens United case eloquently reaffirmed and reinforced that 
overarching principle. In doing so the Court also reaffirmed a number 
of key corollaries.  
First, our incredibly complex system of campaign finance rules and 
regulations—about who can speak and what can be said and when it 
can be said, presided over by the government bureaucrats at the 
Federal Election Commission, and backed up by criminal and civil 
penalties—has created, in effect, a de facto system of prior restraint. 
This creates a chilling effect on political speech all over the country, 
with people and organizations fearful that their ad in the newspaper 
criticizing the President of the United States might somehow be 
deemed illegal, an effect that is anathema to First Amendment values. 
Now the Court has swept those restraints away and allowed any 
group taking any form to espouse any position on the core political 
issues of the day on behalf of its members, contributors, officers, 
shareholders, and employees. 
Second, the Court also took steps to dismantle the First 
Amendment “caste system” whereby whether someone or some 
group could speak depended on who or what they were or when they 
spoke or how they spoke. Before the decision, the right to speak 
depended in part on who was doing the speaking: business 
corporations, no, unless they were media corporations; non-profit 
corporations maybe, depending on where they got their funding; 
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labor unions, no. At the state level there was also a crazy-quilt 
system, with half the states allowing corporations and unions to speak 
out about politics and the other half not. The Court has swept those 
distinctions all aside: the right to speak cannot depend on the identity 
of the speaker. Under the First Amendment, there should be no 
second-class speech or second-class speakers. 
In this regard, the Court explicitly and emphatically reaffirmed the 
First Amendment protections of the institutional press. In fact, the 
Court said that if the government could indeed restrict the First 
Amendment rights of corporations, that would include the power to 
limit media corporations as well, as the Government seemed to 
assert—a clearly unacceptable and unprecedented result. By 
recognizing full First Amendment rights of corporations, including 
media corporations, the Court avoided that outcome. It is quite 
surprising, therefore, that most of the media, rather than praising the 
decision that explicitly protected them, instead excoriated the Court 
for its ruling. Freedom for me, but not for thee, seemed to be the 
media mantra.11  
Finally, the Court’s ruling reconnected with the classic First 
Amendment tradition established by the great twentieth century 
Justices like Black, Douglas, and Warren who understood that the 
protection of free speech went hand in glove with the enhancement of 
democracy. The three Justices, among the most liberal ever to serve 
on the Court, could not have been plainer in their commitment to a 
uniform and universal view of free speech as the indispensable 
precondition for democracy. In a 1957 dissenting opinion on the 
rights of labor unions to speak out about politics, they said: 
Under our Constitution it is We The People who are sovereign. 
The people have the final say. The legislators are their 
spokesmen. The people determine through their votes the destiny 
of the nation. It is therefore important—vitally important—that 
all channels of communication be open to them during every 
election, that no point of view be restrained or barred, and that 
                                                                                                                 
 11. NAT HENTOFF, FREE SPEECH FOR ME—BUT NOT FOR THEE (HarperCollins 1992). 
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the people have access to the views of every group in the 
community.12  
Deeming a particular group “too powerful” to be allowed to speak 
was not a justification “for withholding First Amendment rights from 
any group—labor or corporate. First Amendment rights are part of 
the heritage of all persons and groups in this country.”13  
But the road to these recognitions was a long one. How did the 
Court get from there to here?  
First, of course, there was the Buckley decision, the Court’s first 
major ruling on the conflict between campaign finance restrictions by 
Congress and First Amendment limitations on Congress. There are 
two key ways that Buckley set the stage for Citizens United.  
First, the Court strongly ruled that limitations on how much any 
group or individual could spend to communicate with the public 
about politics were direct limitations on such speech. This violated 
the principles that political speech should not be limited and that 
government was not to be trusted to impose or enforce such limits. 
Campaign spending limits could not be justified as enforcing an 
interest in some kind of rough political equality by 
equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to 
influence the outcome of elections . . . [because the] concept that 
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our 
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly 
foreign to the First Amendment, which was designed “to secure 
‘the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse 
and antagonistic sources,’” and “‘to assure unfettered 
interchange of ideas.’”14  
Nor could limitations on campaign spending by candidates, parties, 
independent groups and individuals be justified by the interest in 
                                                                                                                 
 12. United States v. United Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 593 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 13. Id. at 597 (citation omitted).  
 14. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 48–49 (1976) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
266, 269 (1964)). 
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preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption. That would be 
taken care of by having limits on contributions to candidates, which 
the Court upheld, as well as disclosure of contributions to candidates 
and to independent partisan groups, which the Court upheld as well. 
Second, the Court clearly held that, where speech by individuals 
independent of the candidate was concerned, only speech that 
“expressly advocated” the election or defeat of a candidate could be 
regulated; all other speech was valid commentary on issues, including 
the stands taken on issues by candidates, and was absolutely immune 
from government regulation, regardless of whose speech it was. That 
is how the Court dealt, in effect, with the Nixon impeachment ad 
case, by ruling that speech which criticized politicians, but stopped 
short of urging their election or defeat, was protected “issue 
advocacy” as it came to be known, whose protection was central to 
the First Amendment. 
What about corporations, unions and other similar structural 
entities; what did Buckley say about limiting speech in those settings? 
Buckley did not deal directly with that issue, although the statute 
limiting independent political speech which the Court struck down 
did include corporations and unions in its definition, and some of the 
plaintiffs challenging those limitations were corporations. Some have 
argued that because of these features, Buckley, in effect, struck down 
limitations on corporate or union or other entity political speech. But 
the Court did not deal with the question explicitly, though it arguably 
dealt with it by implication.  
Two years later, however, the Court most explicitly and 
emphatically did deal with those issues in First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti,15 which involved a Massachusetts law that 
prohibited corporations from spending funds to communicate their 
views to the public on referendum questions on the ballot—in that 
case, whether there should be a state personal income tax, which 
many corporations felt would be bad for business. The Court ruled 
that the First Amendment prohibited government from suppressing 
corporate political speech in that fashion. In doing so, it rejected 
                                                                                                                 
 15. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).  
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arguments based on the notion that corporations were artificial state-
created entities that had no rights or whose rights could be dictated by 
the government that chartered them, that corporate spending might 
overwhelm the electoral process and “drown out” individual voices 
or that shareholders’ rights would be undermined by such political 
spending of corporate funds. Of course, all of these arguments would 
be reprised in Citizens United.  
Several years later, the Court expanded corporate speech rights 
even more by holding that non-profit ideological corporations could 
even engage in explicit partisan candidate-related, campaign-related 
electoral speech, so long as they were not themselves funded by 
business corporations (or presumably labor unions as well).16 
So, that was the First Amendment legacy circa 1990—no limits on 
campaign spending by individuals and groups, including 
corporations, where elections were concerned, whether they be 
candidate elections or referendum elections.  
In 1990 the Court decided a case that upheld a Michigan law that 
barred corporations—but not unions or media corporations—from 
making independent expenditures in state elections, including 
advocating the election or defeat of specific candidates. The case was 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,17 and the Court ruled that 
because corporations have so much money, much of it acquired 
because of the corporate form that government permits them to take, 
and because the use of that money through expenditures could 
somehow distort the debate and affect the outcome of the elections, 
the government could directly limit that speech. Those of us on the 
losing side of the case insisted that this was an “express advocacy” 
case and the restraint on corporate expenditures was limited to such 
clearly election-related speech. Although the Court had earlier 
considered, without resolving, the validity of similar restrictions in 
the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Austin was the first time that the Court 
upheld a direct limitation on political speech by a corporation or 
union. Three Justices dissented—Scalia, Kennedy and O’Connor—
                                                                                                                 
 16. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986).  
 17. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
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believing that the Michigan law, with its direct restraint on corporate 
political speech, yet its cynical exemption of both union speech and 
media speech, represented the worst kind of partisan censorship 
antithetical to the principles of the First Amendment which limits the 
power of government to dictate the terms and conditions of political 
speech or the individuals and groups that can engage in it. They 
believed, along with us at the ACLU, that the protections of the First 
Amendment were universal and indivisible and not a caste system 
with a class of political untouchables. 
To say there was a tension between Buckley and Bellotti on the one 
hand and Austin on the other was an understatement. Buckley had 
struck down limits on independent expenditures in absolutist terms, 
though not explicitly referring to corporate speech; Bellotti had struck 
down limits on corporate speech, though in the context of non-
candidate elections, but Austin had held that corporate speech about 
candidates could be restrained because of what the Court perceived as 
its dangers to democracy.  
The tension came to the fore dramatically a decade later when the 
so-called McCain-Feingold law came before the Court in a test case 
filed by Senator Mitch McConnell, a long-time campaign finance 
restrictions foe, who was joined by an alphabet soup list of across-
the-spectrum strange political bedfellows including the AFL-CIO, the 
Chamber of Commerce, the National Rifle Association, and the 
ACLU.18 All of these different groups were united in their opposition 
to a key feature of McCain-Feingold that banned any broadcast 
advertisement that even simply mentioned or listed the name of a 
federal candidate within sixty days of the election. This black out 
period meant, in effect, that some of the most powerful institutional 
voices in America, representing tens of millions of individual 
citizens, would effectively be silenced in their commentary and 
criticism of political candidates (so often incumbents seeking 
reelection) at precisely the moment when the widest circulation of 
critical opinions was essential to the electorate. That is when the 
incumbent politicians in Congress silenced these groups. Remember, 
                                                                                                                 
 18. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
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these were groups independent of any candidates, whose efforts could 
not, by law, be coordinated with any candidate, and who were 
engaged in core political speech at the key time when it was relevant.  
To their discredit, in my view, a majority of the Justices, 5–4, 
upheld this restriction. The majority included Justice O’Connor, who 
had previously supported corporate speech and sided with the 
corporations in the Austin case. Relying heavily on Austin, the 
majority’s specific reasoning in McConnell was that so many of the 
ads run by corporations and unions during the election season, even 
though they did not expressly advocate election or defeat, were so 
barbed and pointed that they were the “functional equivalent of 
express advocacy,” and therefore, all such ads could be presumably 
subject to a facially valid ban.19 Never mind that the ACLU, for 
example, might want to run an ad urging a Representative or Senator 
to vote one way or the other on a key piece of civil liberties 
legislation pending before the Congress in September or October of 
an election year, and without a whisper of partisan overtone or 
undertone. All were swept into the net of prohibition. The ACLU and 
others were dismissively told to go out and form a political action 
committee, i.e., a PAC, instead, to speak for the ACLU, even though 
in its ninety-year history the ACLU has never taken a single partisan 
political position with respect to candidate elections. In both its ruling 
and its approach, the McConnell majority displayed the kind of 
deference to legislative choices rarely seen in a First Amendment 
case and never before seen in a case involving such sweeping 
restraints on political speech. It did seem indeed that the great divide 
between the five Justices in the majority who upheld all the key 
features of McCain-Feingold, and the four dissenters who strenuously 
rejected those restraints, was that, where the proper functioning of 
democracy was concerned, the majority viewed more political speech 
as the problem, while the dissenters saw more political speech as the 
solution.  
One more piece would have to come into place to set the stage for 
the resolution of the Buckley/Bellotti versus Austin/McConnell 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Id. at 206. 
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approaches to all of these difficult issues. That would be the arrival 
on the Court of Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice 
Samuel Alito. Chief Justice Roberts replaced Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
who by the time of McConnell had changed his sharp anti-corporate 
speech position and voted to afford corporations significant First 
Amendment rights. So, that was presumably a wash. But Justice Alito 
replaced Justice O’Connor, who, despite her support in dissent for 
corporate free speech rights in Austin, changed her mind in 
McConnell and provided the swing vote to uphold the unprecedented 
ban on corporate—and union—free speech rights embodied in the 
McCain-Feingold law upheld in McConnell. And that would make a 
major difference: since Justice Alito’s arrival, the Court has ruled for 
the First Amendment over campaign finance restrictions in four out 
of four cases, culminating in the decision in Citizens United.  
So, with the arrival of two new Justices, joining the three Justices 
who had already expressed deep skepticism in dissent over campaign 
finance restrictions—Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas—the 
stage was set for the beginning of a sea change in campaign finance 
law, and the three cases leading up to Citizens United would become 
important bell weathers of that ultimate outcome.  
First, in 2006, the Court, for the first time, struck down a very low 
Vermont campaign contribution limit on the ground that it was 
stifling electoral competition. Even Justice Breyer pulled away from 
the liberals and joined the conservatives to invalidate the contribution 
ceiling.20 
Next, in 2007, the Court decided another case that would clearly 
set the stage for Citizens United. That case also involved a 
conservative group—a non-profit corporation—that wanted to run a 
“grass roots lobbying” commercial urging Wisconsin’s two United 
States Senators to take a certain action on legislative matters. Since 
the ad was to be run during the election season, it was outlawed by 
the McCain-Feingold ban on “electioneering communications,” 
because one of the Senators was up for re-election. Seeking a narrow 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006). The Court also invalidated campaign expenditure limits 
as well, finding them core violations of Buckley’s teachings. 
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ground of decision, the two new Justices ruled that since the ban was 
designed to reach only those ads which were campaign-related in that 
they were the “functional equivalent of express advocacy,” and since 
this ad was not, therefore, it was protected by the First Amendment. 
The plurality opinion then laid down a series of guidelines for 
making that key determination with the strong message that the 
benefit of the doubt had to be given to the speaker, not the 
government. Employing a sports metaphor, Chief Justice Roberts 
said: “Where the First Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the 
speaker, not the censor.”21 The three other conservative Justices 
attacked this approach as a temporizing effort to spare McConnell 
and the “electioneering communication” statute, which they believed 
was fundamentally flawed and should be invalidated in its entirety.22 
From the other direction, however, the liberal Justices complained 
that even the temporizing approach had gutted the McConnell 
decision upholding of the law.23  
In 2008, the Court decided another case involving a different 
provision of McCain-Feingold, one not dealing with corporate or 
union speech or other entity speech, but embodying the so-called, 
“millionaire’s amendment” whereby federal contribution limits were 
raised for any candidate opposing another candidate who was using 
more than a modest amount of his or her own funds for the 
campaign.24 Justified as an effort to “level the playing field” by its 
supporters, the provision was roundly condemned by the majority as 
a cynical attempt to use campaign finance regulations and restrictions 
to control political speech and manipulate electoral outcomes and to 
penalize those who would use their own personal funds to support 
their own campaign speech. Gone was any effort at placating 
Congress either in outcome or attitude. Evident instead was a new 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right To Life, 551 U.S. 449, 474 (2007).  
 22. Justice Scalia tartly observed, “This faux judicial restraint is judicial obfuscation.” Id. at 498 n.7 
(Scalia, J., concurring).  
 23. Justice Souter wrote the lead dissent and reprised his opinion in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri 
Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000), with its broad encouragement for government regulation of 
campaign financing. See Wis. Right To Life, 551 U.S. at 504–36 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 24. Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008). 
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majority’s deep skepticism of the motives and methods of campaign 
finance controls. 
II.  THE CITIZENS UNITED CASE 
And so the stage was set for the constitutional showdown in 
Citizens United.25 It raised a fundamental question under the First 
Amendment: Can the government prevent a corporation from 
criticizing the people who run or seek to run the government?  
The facts have become quite well known: A conservative group 
produced a movie critical of Senator Hillary Clinton during her 2008 
run for President. Because of that timing, broadcasting ads for the 
movie possibly violated the McCain-Feingold campaign finance law, 
as did showing it on on-demand cable television. Remember that the 
Court narrowly upheld that law in 2003, but serious doubts about it 
persisted, and the Court in 2007 whittled down its coverage to reach 
only broadcast ads or communications which were “the functional 
equivalent of express advocacy.” It seemed like the case simply 
raised another narrow question of the reach and validity of the 
specific provision, and many thought the case might go off on a point 
such as whether the law covered advertisements for movies or video-
on-demand, or was it just targeted on thirty second television attack 
ads on candidates. Underneath these narrow issues was a 
foundational question: the ultimate basis for the government 
regulation was that Citizens United was a corporation, though a non-
profit, and accepted some limited funding from business 
corporations. But that describes almost every cause organization in 
America, from the ACLU and the NAACP to the NRA and the 
National Right to Life Committee. So, how could this law be 
justified?  
What made the issue even more important was that during the 
initial argument in the case the government took the position that 
even a book sharply critical of a candidate for President could be 
banned if it was published by a corporation—or presumably a union 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010). 
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as well—as part of the government’s right to control organizations 
from using their funds to speak out in any forum or through any 
medium about a politician up for election in any way that might be 
construed as advocating that politician’s election or defeat. Though 
the government was relying on the Court’s 1990 Austin ruling26 that 
seemed to say so, that seemed a breathtaking assertion. And 
reassurance was hardly supplied by the government’s position during 
re-argument that while the FEC was not likely to proceed against the 
publisher of a book, as a matter of administrative discretion, perhaps, 
publication of political pamphlets, more traditionally associated with 
campaigns and electioneering, might be interdicted if published by a 
corporation.27 Would the breadth of the submission by the 
government be met with a correspondingly broad response from the 
Court and the Justices who had previously expressed skepticism or 
outright condemnation of the law?  
The answer would soon come in a resounding ruling, written by 
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, protecting corporate—and any 
organizational or institutional—speech about government and 
politics. I will discuss the ruling and its critics in a moment, but first 
let me set forth my own views on the proper approach and why I 
think the Court got it so right. 
In my view, the proper approach in this area is to do what the 
Court did: take a unified, universal and indivisible view of the First 
Amendment, namely, that the rights it protects should be available to 
all those individuals and groups which seek to exercise them and 
inform the public. This unified approach says that all entities—be 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).  
 27. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 64–68, Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), 2009 
WL 6325467. The re-argument was heard in September 2009 at a special session of the Court. It was 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s first appearance on the Court following her appointment earlier that summer. 
Perhaps as a result of that, the Court, rather than deciding the case, set it for re-argument in a special 
September session. However, it did not really seem that her views on these issues would differ 
considerably from those of Justice Souter, whom she succeeded, since she had strongly supported 
campaign finance limitations and restrictions while a member of the New York City Campaign Finance 
Board and had later co-authored a law review article that contained a footnote suggesting that campaign 
contributions were akin to bribes. See Sonia Sotomayor & Nicole A. Gordon, Returning Majesty to the 
Law and Politics: A Modern Approach, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 35, 41 n.26 (1996). This left little doubt 
where she would come out on these issues. And, indeed, she would join the Citizens United dissenters 
four months later. 
16
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 3
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss4/3
2011] THE FIRST AMENDMENT . . . UNITED  
 
951 
they for-profit corporations, non-profit corporations, media 
corporations, mom-and-pop corporations, labor unions or any other 
collective entity—are entitled to the same rights under the First 
Amendment, and government cannot restrict those rights because of 
the nature or form such organizations take. The rationale of that 
policy is that the importance of the speech, not the identity of the 
speaker, should be the touchstone for protection. There should not be 
any second-class speakers under the First Amendment. Rather, as 
Chief Justice Warren Burger once said, “[T]he First Amendment does 
not ‘belong’ to any definable category of persons or entities: It 
belongs to all who exercise its freedoms.”28 To argue that the First 
Amendment should only protect people, not entities, has the question 
precisely backward. We protect the speaker to protect the speech. The 
real issue is whether the prohibition abridges expression that the First 
Amendment is designed to protect. The law here deals with 
government efforts to regulate and control speech which is 
universally agreed to be at the core of the First Amendment: 
independent commentary and criticism about government and the 
people who run it during an election season. As the Supreme Court 
has noted time and again, speech concerning public affairs “is the 
essence of self-government.”29 Given these premises, how can the 
government possibly justify claiming the right to censor and prohibit 
the advertising and distribution of a movie critical of one of the most 
prominent political figures of our times, Hillary Clinton, at the time 
when she was running for the highest office in the land? What 
arguments could possibly be made to sustain this result? 
A.  The Flawed Arguments Against Protecting Corporate Political 
Speech 
The defenders of the law, and the dissenters in Court, raised five 
key arguments to support the restriction on corporate—and union30—
                                                                                                                 
 28. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).  
 29. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).  
 30. The statute at issue banned both corporations and unions from engaging in electioneering 
communications. Though the case only involved a non-profit corporation, the majority opinion treated 
the ban as covering unions as well, and, in striking down the statute on its face and invalidating the 
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political speech, in a long and impassioned opinion written by Justice 
John Paul Stevens.  
First, corporations should not have freedom of speech under the 
First Amendment, only people should, even though the text of the 
First Amendment is not so limited and courts have accorded 
corporations extensive constitutional rights for a long time, including 
freedom of speech. Think of this as the impersonation argument. 
Second, corporations have so much money that they will overwhelm 
the political process if they can spend it freely criticizing politicians, 
even though this had not happened in the two dozen states where 
corporations were already free to spend money on politics. This is the 
distortion argument. Third, corporate spending on political speech 
can corrupt our politicians, even though the speech at issue in the 
case was totally independent of and uncoordinated with any 
politicians, which the Court had always held a critical reason for 
protecting such independent speech. This is the corruption argument. 
Fourth, since corporations need charters from the government to 
operate, the government can limit the right of free speech as a 
condition of granting those charters and that permission. In my view 
this is basically an extortion argument. Finally, the rights of 
shareholders were invoked to justify the prohibition, despite the fact 
that the law’s impact went well beyond that purpose. This is the 
imposition argument. 
                                                                                                                 
broader ban on corporate or union expenditures contained in 2 U.S.C. § 441b, the Court’s decision freed 
up union treasuries for explicit political advocacy as well. Despite the complaints by the dissenters and 
their supporters that the majority decision was an extreme act of judicial activism, those same voices 
were silent on the fact that the decision gave blanket protection to unions even though the issues of 
union speech—and whether it differed in any significant way from corporate speech—were not broadly 
before the Court. I guess activism depends on whose ox is being gored. As it turned out, labor did take 
early advantage of its new rights, and reports surfaced of heavy union spending in some elections in the 
months after Citizens United. See T.W. Farnam, Unions Outspending Corporations on Campaign Ads 
Despite Court Ruling, WASH. POST, July 7, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/06/AR2010070602133.html. Unions also announced plans soon after the 
decision for heavy spending in the 2010 elections. See Kevin Bogardus & Sean J. Miller, Unions to 
Spend $100M in 2010 Campaign to Save Dem Majorities, THE HILL, May 21, 2010, 
http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/99103-unions-100m-to-save-the-dems. Labor benefitted from 
the Citizens United ruling because it freed up the ability to use union treasury funds, taken from 
members’ and non-members’ dues, to run express advocacy advertisements and save labor PAC funds 
for direct contributions to candidates. Before Citizens United, express advocacy funds could only come 
from PAC voluntarily contributed funds, and not from union dues.  
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These arguments certainly have a strong populist allure. But, when 
one unpacks them, they are ultimately not persuasive, and, indeed, 
quite troubling. In my view, accepting these arguments hinders 
democracy rather than advancing it because they allow putting 
government in charge of political and electoral speech.  
First: the impersonation argument: only people should have free 
speech rights, not corporations. The First Amendment, of course, 
does not say that.31 Indeed, for almost a century we have recognized 
the constitutional rights of all sorts of corporations and other 
entities—including business corporations, non-profit corporations, 
membership organizations, labor unions—to speak out on all sorts of 
issues.32 In today’s complex world, people can only amplify their 
individual voices by banding together with others in organizations of 
all sizes and shapes. We should celebrate that, not prohibit it. Of 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Interestingly, the First Amendment does mention people in its protections of the right of 
assembly and petition. But it does not qualify who the beneficiaries of speech and press are: “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The 
injunction is directed at Congress without limiting the beneficiaries, be they people or the organizations 
and entities that people create, like corporations and unions. Much ink has been spilled on the question 
of whether the Framers contemplated corporations or other similar entities as entitled to benefit from the 
injunction against Congress or whether the protection of the press was intended to grant the media 
special rights. See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 899–901, 905–07; id. at 925–29 (Scalia, J., concurring); 
id. at 948–52 (Stevens, J., dissenting). People on the left who want to ban for-profit corporate speech but 
finesse the inconvenient fact that all modern news media—whom they want to protect—are corporations 
cling to the argument that the Framers gave special protection to the media. For my part, I think this is 
an improbable assertion, and it has been rejected by a majority of the Court—including stalwart liberals 
like Justices Brennan and Marshall—who agree that protections against defamation, for example, are the 
same for the New York Times as for two neighbors talking over the back fence. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. 
v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 781–85 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In my mind, there is 
a simple explanation for the First Amendment’s protection of both freedom of speech and press: speech 
protects spoken words and press protects printed words, the two methods of political communication 
back then. Moreover, the law of defamation has long recognized distinctions between spoken (slander) 
and written (libel) defamation, and I think the Framers wanted to be sure that you were just as free to 
damn the king in a pamphlet as in a speech. For a general discussion of these issues see Eugene Volokh, 
The Freedom . . . of the Press,” From 1791 to 1868 to Now—Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or 
the Press as a Technology?, 160 U.PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1802229. 
 32. The Court cited two dozen cases going back to 1936 where the Court protected the First 
Amendment rights of corporations. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899–900. Many of them were 
newspapers and other media corporations but many were not. By the way, the Supreme Court did not 
hand down its first decision protection an individual’s rights under the First Amendment until 1931 in 
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), though it considered, and rejected, First Amendment 
claims from individuals since around 1907. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907). So, it is fair 
to say that the Supreme Court has been protecting the First Amendment rights of corporations and other 
entities formed by people for almost as long as it has been protecting the rights of people themselves. 
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course, organizations are not real people. But they are associations of 
individuals, and are made up of, are run by and embody the interests 
and concerns of real people. And the speech they produce on behalf 
of their entities should be entitled to no less protection than if it 
emanated from the individuals personally. Moreover, if we deny 
constitutional protections here, then we could limit or withhold the 
right of such organizations to exercise other First Amendment rights, 
such as the right to lobby on legislation, since they are not people, or 
to run ads urging the public to oppose legislation that might counter 
the interest of the people who work for or invest in the corporation. 
Can a corporation oppose a law proposed by politician X on the 
ground that it would require the corporation to close the plant in 
town? To say no, they are not people, and they cannot speak out in 
that fashion is not only questionable under the First Amendment, but 
begins to raise troubling questions of due process of law, by 
depriving the corporation, and the people whose interests it 
embodies, of the ability to defend its business interests in what it 
considers to be an effective manner through communicating with the 
public. And, if a corporation can speak out against the law, why can it 
not also speak out against the politician who would support such a 
law and urge the people to vote against that candidate so he cannot 
enact such laws? Far from being a threat to democracy, this kind of 
speech would seem to be a boon to it.  
A variant of the only-people-have-free-speech argument that one 
hears a lot is the refrain that since corporations cannot vote in 
elections for candidates, they should not be able to speak about 
elections and candidates. But, of course, the ACLU does not vote 
either, nor can the AFL-CIO, not to mention the Atlanta Constitution, 
yet those entities “speak” about elections and candidates on a daily 
basis. Likewise, young people cannot vote; non-citizens cannot vote, 
even those who have been here as lawful, permanent resident aliens 
for decades. Yet we would presumably not allow any of them to be 
barred from speaking on the ground that they are barred from voting. 
Not to mention the hundreds and thousands of felons or ex-felons 
who are denied the right to vote by state law. Should they also be 
denied the right to speak out on politics and elections, particularly to 
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urge changes in the laws which deny them the right to vote? Now that 
would be an ironic blow to strike for democracy and equality: bar 
disenfranchised felons from speaking against the laws which 
disenfranchise them. Since the people who oppose such felon 
disenfranchisement laws are often the same people who oppose the 
Citizens United decision, I wonder how they might reconcile that 
tension.33 The right to vote in elections, as important and central to 
democracy as it is, can in no way be deemed a prerequisite for or 
coextensive with the right to speak out about the issues and the 
candidates in those elections, especially where all people and groups 
are affected by the outcome of these elections.  
Second, corporations have so much money that they will 
overwhelm the political process if they can spend it freely criticizing 
politicians. But a lot of individuals have tons of money too—most of 
it made through their successful ownership of corporations—George 
Soros and David Koch come quickly to mind—and we do not limit 
their right to speak. Why should we limit corporations on that 
ground? We have allowed the corporate owners of the New York 
Times to endorse a presidential candidate on page twenty-six, but 
made it a crime for the corporate owners of General Motors to pay 
for an ad with the same message on page twenty-five, even though 
the First Amendment protects freedom of speech and of the press 
equally and gives no special or greater rights to the press than to 
anyone else. 34 Moreover, if we can limit corporations, then that 
would seem to include media corporations as well, especially those 
owned by non-media entities. If General Electric can speak out about 
politicians, through its part ownership of NBC, why can’t General 
Motors do likewise without having to buy a media arm to do so? 
Similarly, the double standard fiction that it is proper to allow the 
                                                                                                                 
 33. The well-known Brennan Center for Justice, for example, probably among the most powerful—
not to mention well-funded by foundations and corporations—voices for campaign finance controls and 
harshest critics of the Court’s decision in Citizens United—is also spearheading the campaign against 
felon disenfranchisement. See Brennan Center for Justice, About Us, http://www.brennancenter.org/ 
pages/about (last visited Mar. 25, 2011). 
 34. Of course now that General Motors is owned, basically, by the United States Government and 
the United Auto Workers Union, using it as an example of a business corporation which ought to have 
the same First Amendment rights as a media corporation is compromised a bit to say the least.  
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government to give media corporations greater protection, by 
exempting them from the campaign finance laws, than other 
corporations or groups, breaks down in practical application when we 
have energy companies like General Electric owning television 
networks like NBC.35  
Moreover, approximately half the States have permitted 
independent corporate speech in their elections, and even corporate 
contributions to candidates, and the sky has not fallen. Instead more 
political speech, and a free flow of information to the public has 
resulted—a positive outcome for the First Amendment and for our 
democratic processes.  
Indeed, it reminds me of the old adage about The Dog that Didn’t 
Bark. During the 2008 Presidential campaigns, the federal law at the 
time allowed all corporations and all labor unions to spend any 
amount of money on any communication in any media at any time up 
to the election saying anything about any presidential candidate, so 
long as (1) it did not expressly advocate the election or defeat of that 
candidate or (2) if broadcast during the election season it was not the 
“functional equivalent” of expressly advocating the election or defeat 
of any candidate.36 But any criticism of the views and policies and 
background of any federal candidate was fair game, subject to the 
two limitations I just mentioned. I have heard frequently that the 
giant corporations like Exxon have billions of dollars in profits lying 
around to overwhelm our democracy if allowed to do so. You would 
have thought that if there was ever a major national political 
candidate who seemed a threat to some of those corporations it would 
have been a former community organizer, nominated from the left 
wing of his party, railing against corporate “special interests” and 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Indeed, the lines between media and non-media corporations can blur considerably. When a 
cable communications company like Comcast purchases an interest in a media company like NBC, does 
that give it more First Amendment protection than a widget company? Also, some have suggested that 
General Electric’s corporate push to promote green energy was given a ready reception by NBC, the 
media corporation it partly owned. Why should the NBC speech be privileged if it furthers the interest of 
its corporate parent, the energy company? It seems it would be better to eliminate all of these 
distinctions and treat all speakers as equal under the First Amendment, especially in a world where 
bloggers and the internet have also broken down traditional categories of who is the media, and the 
Court has never accepted the special status of the press in any event. 
 36. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
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their stranglehold on government, preaching transformational change 
and having never shown much interest in the corporate side of the 
ledger. And yet, corporate America was deafeningly silent during the 
2008 presidential elections, and, so far as I know, Exxon did not 
spend a dime trying to defeat Barack Obama for President. Not to 
mention the fact that, nowadays, corporations are not the political 
monolith they once were, and come in various political shades, 
including those who are green, gay-friendly, and were major 
supporters of Obamacare.37 In short, there is no indication 
whatsoever that the ruling in Citizens United will open the corporate 
floodgates or cause an avalanche of advertising and communicating. 
And if so, that would simply give us more political speech to inform 
our political process.38 
Third, corporate spending on political speech can corrupt our 
politicians. Apart from the question of corporate speech drowning out 
the voices of individual citizens in general, a related argument against 
permitting corporations to speak about politicians is that such 
spending can corrupt or unduly influence our politicians. But it must 
be remembered that the speech at issue in Citizens United was 
independent speech—which, by definition, cannot be coordinated 
with any candidate. And one of the most settled principles in this 
entire field of campaign finance law, as the Court has repeatedly held 
for thirty-five years, from Buckley through Citizens United, is that 
independent campaign speech by individuals and groups is not 
corrupting—indeed, it is at the core of the First Amendment. Now, 
people may question that entire premise, and say that independent 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Indeed, some companies which found themselves supporting candidates on the Republican side 
of the ledger risked being the target of high pressure boycott campaigns like the one directed at the 
Target stores because its president authorized a contribution to a group which then supported candidates 
opposed to same-sex marriage.  
 38. As indicated supra note 8, there has been much misinformation about the level of corporate 
spending on the 2010 elections and whether it increased significantly in the wake of the Court’s 
decision. That there was more spending in general was clear and substantial spending by independent 
groups and individuals. But how much of that was funded by unions and corporations and involved 
express advocacy that would have been barred prior to the Court’s ruling is very unclear. One thing that 
is clear is that independent spending did have a beneficial effect in helping to unseat many incumbents 
and leveling the playing field by offsetting the large fund-raising advantages that incumbents often have. 
See Bradley A. Smith, The Incumbent’s Bane: Citizens United and the 2010 Election, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
25, 2011, at A15. 
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speech for or against politicians can, indeed, influence them and 
should be limited for that reason. But the Court has never retreated 
from the position that independent speech in normal elections cannot 
corrupt, and its application in the context of corporate speech is 
entirely consistent with the analytic framework established in 
Buckley. So, why should an independent ad paid for by a corporation 
be treated any differently?  
And if one does find special dangers in independent corporate—or 
union?39—speech about politicians, sufficient to warrant prohibition, 
what is the scope of that area of prohibition? Express advocacy only? 
The “functional equivalent” of express advocacy? Any speech that 
criticizes—or praises—a candidate’s stand on an issue? Any speech 
that even just mentions the name of a candidate during an election 
season, as part of a “box score” of the candidate’s performance on 
issues of concern to the sponsoring organization? The latter restraints 
would endanger “issue advocacy” and effectively put the ACLU and 
all the other cause organizations across the political spectrum out of 
the business of public criticism of political leaders.40 Is that an 
outcome to be sought? The supposed dangers of independent 
corporate speech—which have been anything but manifest to this 
point—pale in comparison, in my view, to the harms to First 
Amendment rights—and to democratic debate and discourse—of 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Estimates are that in 2008, unions, especially public sector unions, spent $400 million to help 
elect President Obama and a Democratic Congress, who then turned around and favored those unions to 
the tune of tens of billions of dollars in various stimulus and other legislative programs. See Michael 
Barone, Big Labor is Humbled by Blanche Lincoln’s Win, REAL CLEAR POLITICS, June 14, 2010, 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/06/14/big_labor_is_humbled_by_blanche_lincolns_win_
105949.html. If corporate independent ads are to be viewed as corrupting, should all this union 
independent political spending be deemed similarly suspect? 
 40. It is a standard practice of such groups to create a “dirty dozen” list, whereby they rank the 
records of politicians on issues of concern to those groups. In effect, they “threaten” to give politicians a 
poor rating if they do not support the group’s agenda. In one of the statutory provisions at issue in the 
Buckley litigation, Congress tried to regulate such activity but met a unanimously hostile circuit court 
that declared that such restrictions were facially unconstitutional. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 
869–79 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 424 U.S. 1 (1976). How such “box scores” and their 
threatened use differ in any significant degree from a corporate-sponsored ad criticizing a candidate’s 
stand on issues of interest to the corporation is difficult to fathom. As the Court correctly pointed out in 
Citizens United, the fact that such speech would have an effect on a candidate’s position is not 
corruption; it is the essence of democracy.  
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ceding to government the power to control all such independent 
speech emanating from unions and corporations.41 
The consequences for the right of the public to be informed about 
the records and conduct of candidates for office would be significant. 
Moreover, indeed, what happened to the public’s right to know and 
the marketplace of ideas? If a corporation has something important to 
say, it would seem that the members of the public should be entitled 
to hear it and either accept it or reject it on the merits. That is the 
normal First Amendment default rule we have always followed. Why 
change that now?  
Fourth, the government extortion gambit: since corporations need 
special government permission and privileges to exist, function, and 
make money, government can limit their right to free speech as a 
condition of granting corporate charters. That little piece of legal 
extortion should give us pause in an era where government has to 
give permission for so many businesses and professions to operate as 
well. Anyone who needs a license to practice law or be a doctor or 
open a hardware store could come under that rule. Can government 
tell all of those people and entities what they can say as a price of 
getting a license or permit? We should hesitate to use arguments that 
resonate with those used in the past to keep Communists and other 
political dissidents from getting licenses and benefits, which were 
claimed to be “privileges,” not rights.42 Why would we want to 
                                                                                                                 
 41. The contention that independent political speech can be corrupting is supported by reliance on a 
decision where the Supreme Court ruled that due process was violated when a judge ruled on a case 
involving a company whose president had spent millions of dollars on independent expenditures in a 
judicial campaign to support that judge’s election. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 
2252 (2009). That decision, authored by the same Justice who wrote Citizens United, is claimed to be in 
such tension as to lead to incoherent results. See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of 
Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011). The dissenters in Citizens United voiced the same 
complaints. But Caperton involved the requirement that judges, not politicians, be unbiased and 
uninfluenced by off-the-bench relationships with or support by litigants. The gravamen is the concern 
with conflict of interest undermining judicial impartiality and objectivity, and the special status of the 
judicial process. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (holding that courts are 
sufficiently special so that restrictions on the arguments that could be made by government-funded 
lawyers violate the First Amendment and impair the proper functioning of courts; such funding 
limitations might be permissible in other settings). Politicians, on the contrary, are not supposed to be 
unbiased, and when they wish to be responsive to the people and groups that support them and their 
policies, that is democracy, not impropriety.  
 42. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958). 
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resurrect a similar notion here? In addition, if corporations can be 
restricted in their electioneering political speech by a chartering 
process, the same power would apply to lobbying also. You can 
guarantee that many of the same groups and politicians who want to 
limit corporate political speech would dearly love to limit corporate 
lobbying activity as well, despite the First Amendment. It is a road 
that we should be glad the Court has refused to continue to travel. To 
be sure, centuries of corporate law have imposed manifold 
restrictions on the directors and managers of those corporations, and 
required them to use their best judgment in advancing the interests of 
the corporation. But if those managers feel that speaking out on a 
political issue or candidate is in the corporation’s best interest, we 
should not allow the government to silence that speech on the 
grounds that it has the power to license that corporation in the first 
place. 
Finally, the shareholder imposition argument holds that it would 
violate the rights of shareholders for corporate funds to be spent on 
politics against their will. But what if the shareholders approve the 
spending, or what if there are no shareholders because it is not a stock 
corporation or a publicly held company? Citizens United had no 
shareholders. Indeed, the vast majority of all corporations in America 
are small, mom-and-pop companies, with a sole proprietor; yet the 
federal ban on corporate electoral speech drew no such distinctions 
whatsoever. In addition, what about all of the charitable and 
community gifts that corporations make now without prior or explicit 
shareholder permission, not to mention the lobbying activities in 
which they might engage?43 Should those corporate expenditures all 
be subject to state-approved restraint? Here, too, normal corporate 
law doctrines and processes should govern, not special rules that 
deny corporations and the people who comprise them their First 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Many corporations make charitable contributions to museums that some shareholders may 
complain are sexist or racist in their policies or acquisitions, to cause organizations such as the ACLU, 
which some shareholders may resent, or to universities whose admissions policies may anger other 
shareholders. Should all of this corporate activity be subject to shareholder restraint? Or just political 
speech?  
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Amendment rights across the board by imposing a government-
compelled prior restraint disguised as shareholder democracy.44  
B.  The Proper Protection of Political Speech  
Happily, from my perspective, the Court rejected these various 
arguments for limiting and prohibiting the speech of corporations and 
unions. Instead, the Court adopted a unified, universal, and 
indivisible approach that makes First Amendment protection and 
rights available to all. All groups are entitled to the same rights under 
the First Amendment, and government cannot restrict those rights 
because of the nature or form such organizations take, the medium 
they use, or the message they communicate. There should not be any 
second-class speech or speakers under the First Amendment. 
Let me briefly review what the Court did and why I think it was 
good for the First Amendment and for democracy. 
In the Citizens United case, the Supreme Court invalidated the ban 
which prohibited, under threat of criminal penalty, all corporations 
and all labor unions from speaking out, on behalf of their directors, 
officers, employees, customers, shareholders, members, and 
supporters, about government and politics in any way that even 
mentioned a politician or an incumbent officeholder running for re-
election. In my view, that was a landmark decision for the First 
Amendment and, yes, for our democracy. Like all great decisions, the 
Court went back to basics and relied on fundamental First 
Amendment principles embedded in Buckley and Bellotti, from which 
the Court in Austin and McConnell had strayed.  
In its ruling, the Court emphasized what no one seriously disputes, 
namely, that the primary purpose of the First Amendment’s 
guarantees of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and petition is to 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Here, too, the contrast with unions is instructive. It is estimated that union membership, at least 
in private sector unions, is about sixty percent Democratic and forty percent Republican. Yet union 
political expenditures tend to favor Democrats over Republicans by a lopsided ninety-five percent to 
five percent margin. See Mark Tapscott, Where the Cash Goes, the Democratic Policy Flows, WASH. 
EXAMINER, Jan. 26, 2011, http://washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/special-reports/2011/01/special-
report-where-cash-goes-democratic-policy-flows. Should union members be able to insist on parity in 
those expenditures, compatible with the political apportionment of the membership? 
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enhance democracy by insuring an informed electorate capable of 
governing its own affairs. The First Amendment has always been 
based on the idea that the more speech we have, the better off we are, 
as individuals and as a people. The Citizens United decision 
eloquently reaffirms and re-enforces that core constitutional 
principle.  
As the Court put it: 
Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the 
means to hold officials accountable to the people. . . . []In a 
republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the 
citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office 
is essential.[] The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, 
and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to 
enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect 
it.45 
That is why, the Court pointed out, we have a First Amendment: 
Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First 
Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects 
or viewpoints. Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing 
among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not 
others. As instruments to censor, these categories are 
interrelated: Speech restrictions based on the identity of the 
speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.46 
And the decision restored a number of key First Amendment 
principles which had become obscured in the zeal to “reform” our 
elections. 
The first principle is that we should never have to get the 
government’s advance permission in order to criticize the 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1976)).  
 46. Id. at 898–99 (citations omitted). 
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government.47 Yet our incredibly complex system of campaign 
finance rules and regulations, with unclear statutory meaning, made 
worse by uncertain ad hoc enforcement, backed up by criminal and 
civil penalties and enforced by government, has created a de facto 
system of prior restraint which causes a chilling effect on political 
speech all over the country in a fashion reminiscent of the royal 
system for licensing the press that our founders wrote the First 
Amendment to avoid. The chilling effect on speech that system 
caused, with people fearful that their ad in the newspaper criticizing 
the President of the United States might somehow be deemed illegal 
was anathema to First Amendment values. While one could seek an 
advance determination by the FEC about whether any particular ad 
was permitted, that was the whole problem. Now the Supreme Court 
has swept those restraints away and allowed any group to speak out, 
without prohibition or restraint, on the core political issues of the day 
on behalf of its members, contributors, shareholders, employees, and 
the like. 
The second principle is that the First Amendment disfavors a 
“caste system” in electoral speech—with certain privileged speakers 
and certain pariah speakers—and the Court’s decision has largely 
dismantled that system.48 Before the Court’s ruling, the right to speak 
turned on who was doing the speaking: business corporations, no, 
unless they were media corporations; nonprofit corporations, maybe, 
depending on where they got their funding; labor unions, no. At the 
state level, there was also a crazy-quilt system, with half the states 
allowing corporations and unions to speak out about politics, and the 
other half, not. That’s all gone now. The Court made clear that the 
protection of political speech is so critical to democracy that, 
therefore, the right to speak about government and politics cannot 
depend on the identity of the speaker—individual, corporate, profit, 
nonprofit, union, media entity—all have equal rights to speak: no 
privileged speakers and no pariah speakers. Under the First 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Id. at 894–96. 
 48. Id. at 898–99.  
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Amendment, where political speech is concerned, there can be no 
second-class speakers.  
To reach this conclusion, the Court demonstrated why the Austin 
decision was a departure from the principles of Buckley and 
Bellotti.49 Austin had said that corporate speech could be prohibited 
because the wealth of corporations acquired in the economic market 
place might “distort” the political debate; McConnell had relied on 
Austin. But the Austin principle proved too much. It was inconsistent 
with Buckley’s rejection of limitations on expenditures where 
individuals and organizations were concerned, and individual wealth 
and influence came from the economic market place as well. And 
Bellotti had rejected a similar concern with distortion where 
corporate electoral speech was concerned. Finally, if the distortion 
rationale were accepted, this “would produce the dangerous, and 
unacceptable, consequence that Congress could ban political speech 
of media corporations.”50 Since that would be impermissible, banning 
the speech of any other corporation would be impermissible as well, 
because the Court had consistently rejected the proposition that the 
institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of 
other speakers. Such consequences were too much weight for the 
anti-distortion rationale to bear, especially given the extraordinary 
breadth of application of the ban on corporate speech, applying to an 
estimated six million corporations, and producing “censorship . . . 
vast in its reach.”51 
Three other arguments were dispatched more quickly. The 
corruption argument, i.e., that independent speech by corporations or 
unions will corrupt the officeholder benefitted by that speech, came 
to grief on the deeply settled understanding from Buckley forward 
that, almost by definition, independent expenditures cannot be 
deemed corrupting.52 In addition, the access and influence that might 
accompany the provision of independent political support was viewed 
not as corrupting, but as an understandable feature of politics, just as 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. at 902–13. 
 50. Id. at 905. 
 51. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 907. 
 52. Id. at 908–11.  
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a labor union’s support for a candidate during an election might be 
rewarded by the candidate’s support of the interests of that union 
after the election.53 Organized labor spent hundreds of millions of 
dollars to help elect President Obama, and his policies have 
benefitted labor’s interests on a number of fronts.  
Likewise, the shareholder concern justification floundered on the 
fact that the categorical statutory ban seemed to have nothing 
whatsoever to do with this concern and was in no way tailored to fit 
those problems.54 Finally, the concern with foreign influences—a 
surprising eruption of nativism from the liberal wing of the Court—
was answered by the observation that the statute at issue was not 
limited to that concern, and the issue was saved for another day.55  
Given the firestorm of criticism that the decision received almost 
immediately upon being announced, a person could be excused from 
not realizing that the Court did, in fact, uphold an important portion 
of the law: namely, the requirement that those organizations that 
engage in the kind of “electioneering communications” now fully 
protected by the First Amendment must disclose who they are during 
their broadcast advertisement, must disclaim affiliation with any 
candidate or political party, and must file periodic and publicly 
available reports within twenty-four hours with the government 
disclosing the identity of their significant contributors, institutional or 
individual. Citizens United had argued that the disclaimer and 
disclosure provisions should be applied only to the functional 
equivalent of express advocacy, but the Court rejected this narrow 
application and upheld the broad reach of the statute. In the Court’s 
view, the proper First Amendment resolution was to permit the 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Some experts have suggested that the decision will put pressure on Congress to raise contribution 
limits or relax prohibitions on corporate contributions. The Court did narrow the concept of corruption, 
but it only did so by harking back to the Buckley concept of quid pro quo corruption. Since Buckley 
upheld contribution limits, that should remain the same, so far as the Court is concerned. The prospect of 
seven-figure independent spending has materialized for several elections now, and while it should cause 
pause about the continuation of lopsidedly low contribution limits, that has not prompted change up to 
now, except for the modest increase of contribution limits in the McCain-Feingold Bill and the indexing 
of such limits for inflation. Perhaps legislative adjustment of the contribution limits and preclusions 
would be in order. 
 54. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911.  
 55. Id. 
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speech and the disclosure of it, so that there will be a win-win for the 
electorate: they will have the benefit of the speech and of knowing 
who supported it. 
The Court’s bottom line: “The First Amendment protects political 
speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to 
the speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This transparency 
enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper 
weight to different speakers and messages.”56 
In my view, as indicated above, the Court’s Citizen United 
decision reconnects with the classic First Amendment tradition 
bequeathed to us by Justices like Black, Douglas, and Warren—
champions of free speech who understood that First Amendment 
rights have to be universal and indivisible in order for democracy to 
flourish. The three Justices once clearly summarized the applicable 
principles as follows: 
Under our Constitution it is We The People who are sovereign. 
The people have the final say. The legislators are their 
spokesmen. The people determine through their votes the destiny 
of the nation. It is therefore important—vitally important—that 
all channels of communications be open to them during every 
election, that no point of view be restrained or barred, and that 
the people have access to the views of every group in the 
community. 
. . . . 
Some may think that one group or another should not express its 
views in an election because it is too powerful, because it 
advocates unpopular ideas, or because it has a record of lawless 
action. But these are not justifications for withholding First 
Amendment rights from any group—labor or corporate. First 
Amendment rights are part of the heritage of all persons and 
groups in this country. They are not to be dispensed or withheld 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Id. at 916. 
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merely because we or the Congress thinks the person or group is 
worthy or unworthy.57 
These words came from perhaps the three greatest liberals who 
ever sat on the Supreme Court. How could they have endorsed a 
ruling that would threaten democracy? Allowing government to 
dictate the terms of the political debate and the identity of the 
political speakers—those are the threats to democracy which the 
Court in the Citizens United case wisely rebuffed by broadly ruling 
that the First Amendment protects all individuals and groups that 
exercise its freedoms. 
Many have said that campaign finance controls pit liberty of 
speech and press against equality and democratic participation.58 But 
the clash between liberty and equality is a false clash and a false 
choice. Protecting the right of everyone and every entity to speak—
liberty—will enhance the ability of everyone to participate more fully 
in the political process—equality. On the other hand, seeking to 
restrict liberty to achieve equality is a fool’s errand. It will neither 
protect liberty nor achieve equality. In squarely recognizing that 
critical connection, the Court’s opinion was a historic and heroic 
affirmation of the central meaning of the First Amendment. All 
individuals and groups are equally entitled to exercise their freedom 
of speech. Now that is the proper way to level the playing field. 
Of course, there was a powerful and passionate dissent, objecting 
to the Court’s methods and result. On the former point, one 
contention was that the Court could have decided the decision in 
Citizens United’s favor on any one of a number of narrower grounds, 
thus avoiding the constitutional ruling. But since none of the 
dissenters thought those grounds worthy enough to invoke, this 
criticism seems to lack much seriousness. There was the typical 
argument about stare decisis and the overruling of precedent, but the 
majority’s response was that the earlier decisions were wrong at the 
                                                                                                                 
 57. United States v. Int’l Union United Auto., 352 U.S. 567, 593, 597 (1957) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted).  
 58. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 39–
50 (Alfred A. Knopf 2005).  
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time and where the protection of political speech is concerned, the 
niceties of stare decisis properly yielded to constitutional imperative. 
There was also a pitched battle over whether the Framers of the First 
Amendment would support the majority or the dissent, with the 
liberals invoking the kind of full-throated originalism that rarely 
comes from that quarter, to insist that the Framers would not have 
protected corporate speech, and the majority claiming that the kind of 
government control of political speech represented by the challenged 
statute was the primary type of evil that the First Amendment was 
intended to prevent. Finally, the broadest disagreement was about 
whether corporations should have the same First Amendment 
protection as individuals and what effect that will have on our 
democracy. While the dissenters conceded that corporations were 
entitled to have significant First Amendment protection and 
disclaimed any intent to roll back such rights across the board, they 
nonetheless believed that candidate-related electoral speech by rich 
corporations posed too much of a threat to democracy. Once again 
the battle lines were clear: the liberals think that political speech is 
the problem; the conservatives think it is the solution.  
III.  THE LESSONS LEARNED 
So what do we take away from this vitally important case? First, 
the holdings were that the government may not prevent corporations 
and unions from criticizing politicians running for office, even 
including expressly advocating their election or defeat. However, 
such speech remains subject to various forms of disclosure. In some 
ways, this seems like a modest and certainly not a very radical 
approach and result.  
But, secondly, I should confess that in many ways both the result 
and the reasoning channel concepts that the ACLU and others have 
been advancing for decades in the debate over campaign finance 
restrictions and First Amendment rights.59 These include the 
                                                                                                                 
 59. The ACLU changed its policy on many campaign finance issues a few months after Citizens 
United to approve restrictions on, for example, contributions to candidates, a position that it had 
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fundamental concepts that political speech is essential to an effective 
democracy, that the more political speech you have, the better 
democracy you will have, that campaign finance limitations 
necessarily and inherently involve controls on political speech, that 
government cannot be trusted not to rig those rules to protect 
incumbents and the status quo, that this requires courts to give a 
skeptical strict scrutiny to campaign finance controls, that the 
campaign finance regulatory regime has become so complex and 
convoluted that it is tantamount to a de facto system of prior restraint, 
that a “caste system” with privileged speakers and pariah speakers is 
anathema to First Amendment principles, and thus, finally, that the 
rights in this area have to be universal and indivisible. In one way or 
another, these are all themes that civil libertarian critics of the 
campaign finance system have sounded over the years, which the 
Court majority has, more than any time since Buckley and Bellotti, 
embedded into its analysis. So, in terms of attitude and framework 
and approach, the case reflects the marked shift that had become 
increasingly noticeable in the more recent cases.  
Third, in terms of doctrinal change versus practical change, of 
course corporations and unions are now free to engage in express 
advocacy of election or defeat. But as suggested earlier, this is not 
that great an expansion of rights over what the law was previously. 
Ever since Buckley, those entities were free to engage in any public 
commentary or criticism of candidates for office as long as they 
stopped short of express advocacy, and to spend as much as they 
wanted on such speech. With McCain-Feingold, upheld in McConnell 
in 2003, there was a prohibition on broadcast ads that mentioned 
candidates during the election season; but in 2007 that prohibition 
was narrowed to encompass only such broadcast advertisements 
which contained the functional equivalent of express advocacy. 
While Citizens United certainly eliminates the remaining restraint on 
                                                                                                                 
previously rejected. But, despite rolling back some of its policy in the area of campaign finance, it 
reaffirmed its view that all organizations, including business and for-profit corporations, should have the 
kinds of First Amendment rights to make independent expenditures safeguarded in Citizens United. See 
Floyd Abrams, Ira Glasser & Joel Gora, Op-Ed., The ACLU Approves Limits on Speech, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 30, 2010, at A15. 
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content and allows speakers to conclude with the bottom line—vote 
for or against the person—that new entitlement does not add that 
much to what could have been said before. And though the dissenters 
would still prohibit this corporate speech because of their concern 
about its impact on elections and democracy, even they would accord 
corporations and other entities broad First Amendment protection and 
not accept the theory that as creatures of the state, corporations can 
be subject to broad limitations by the state. So the analytical gap 
between the two sides was perhaps smaller than the overheated 
rhetoric in the opinions might suggest. 
Fourth, while the case only involved a nonprofit ideological 
corporation, the ruling and its reasoning protect the rights of unions 
and their members and for-profit corporations and the people 
associated with them as well. It is interesting that in all of the charges 
of “judicial activism” hurled at the Court, very few complained that 
the decision freed unions and their members equally with 
corporations and nonprofits from the statutory restraints. 
Likewise, the case also was perhaps more significant in terms of 
the governing doctrine concerning the nature of the government 
interests that can sustain campaign finance controls. Ever since 
Buckley, the Court had insisted that independent campaign speech, 
which by definition cannot be coordinated with a candidate, could not 
be limited on the grounds that it might corrupt or unduly influence 
the candidate/officeholder beneficiary of that speech. Over the years, 
the concept of corruption had been expanded considerably from the 
core of quid pro quo arrangements, bordering on bribery, to the much 
broader notion that those who provide financial support for a 
candidate may have undue influence or improper access, or that the 
situation might create “the appearance of” undue influence or 
improper access. With such a broad concept of the kind of concern 
that might justify campaign finance regulations, most would be 
sustained.60 Citizens United altered that approach and insisted that 
only hardcore corruption was a compelling concern to be guarded 
                                                                                                                 
 60. See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t 
PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000). 
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against; that influence and access occasioned by independent speech 
supporting a candidate was not sufficient to justify restricting that 
speech. Instead, if a candidate gives an audience to a group which 
supported him or her, that is basically politics, not corruption, and an 
informed citizenry could be trusted to weigh and measure it 
accordingly. The dissenters, on the other hand, worried that 
corporations would use the threat of mounting large advertising 
campaigns against politicians as a cudgel to win legislative or official 
concessions from officeholders. Of course they could do that before 
Citizens United, so long as Express Advocacy was avoided. In this 
regard, the decision clearly harkened back to Buckley which did not 
see a threat to electoral integrity in the possibility of unrestricted 
independent campaign spending. 
Also significant was the Court’s warm embrace of broad disclosure 
of independent campaign spending as perhaps a political antidote to 
expected negative reaction to the main part of the ruling. The opinion 
may very well have broadened the kinds of speech vulnerable to 
disclosure, so that groups like the ACLU may have lost the right to 
protect the anonymity of their members and contributors as the price 
to be paid for criticizing elected government officials in ways subject 
to disclosure.  
Other big losers are the political parties, and indeed, the candidates 
as well. Now that corporations and unions are largely free to use, in 
effect, “soft money” to directly attack candidates and urge their 
election or defeat, candidates and the parties that support them are 
disadvantaged because they can only use so-called “hard money” to 
fight back. This is a serious consequence of the necessary vindication 
of First Amendment rights of independent groups, but it requires 
some compensation in terms either of significant public financing, 
much higher contribution limits, or allowing parties to coordinate 
their spending with their candidates without limitation.61  
                                                                                                                 
 61. On the latter point, immodestly, please see PETER J. WALLISON & JOEL M. GORA, BETTER 
PARTIES, BETTER GOVERNMENT: A REALISTIC PROGRAM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (2009), 
discussing the need to enhance the ability of the parties to aid their candidates, especially in light of the 
expanded electoral influence of corporations and unions that Citizens United makes possible. Legislation 
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That’s what the Court did in Citizens United. 
IV.  THE POPULAR MYTH-CONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE DECISION 
Let me describe, briefly, what the Court did not do, despite the 
myths that have swirled around the decision since the day it came 
down.  
First, the Court did not protect only Exxon and other big business 
corporations. The beneficiaries of the ruling also include the ACLU, 
the NAACP, the Sierra Club, and all the other non-profit cause 
organizations; the New York Times and all the other media 
corporations; all the mom-and-pop corporations; and every labor 
union in America. Indeed, early returns indicate that labor has been a 
particularly potent beneficiary since unions can now spend members’ 
dues on direct political advocacy, freeing up their voluntarily-
contributed PAC funds for candidate contributions. During this past 
election, according to some reports, the biggest spending labor 
unions, particularly major public employee unions, comfortably kept 
pace with business groups, including Karl Rove’s projects. These 
groups should be thanking the Supreme Court rather than 
condemning it.62 
Second, the Court did not overturn 100 years of precedent, as some 
in high office have suggested. It overruled the 1990 Austin case, and 
the portions of the 2003 McConnell case that relied on Austin.  
Third, the Court did not allow foreign corporations to take over our 
elections. The law currently bars foreign spending on our elections, 
and the Court explicitly stated that it’s decision did not involve those 
provisions.  
                                                                                                                 
to ease the restrictions on party use of hard money in coordination with their candidates has been 
introduced and has support from many quarters of the campaign finance community.  
 62. There have been varying estimates of what was spent by the different independent groups in the 
2010 elections. Some claim that unions spent approximately $200 million at the national level to support 
Democratic candidates. See Douglas E. Schoen, The Union Threat to the Democrats’ Future, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 20, 2011, at A17. Indeed, among the big spenders last year, the top public employee unions—
AFSCME, the SEIU, and the NEA—reported spending $172 million, as compared to the $140 million 
spent by the Chamber of Commerce and the American Crossroads group. See Brody Mullins & John D. 
McKinnon, Campaign’s Big Spenders, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2010, at A1.    
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Fourth, the Court did not allow corporations to “buy” candidates or 
elections, since the decision was only about independent 
expenditures, not contributions, as the Court explicitly pointed out, 
and independent expenditures have been protected since Buckley on 
the theory that they generally cannot corrupt the candidates they 
benefit. Now one can argue that the distinction is a questionable one, 
but it has been deeply etched in our law since Buckley, and the Court 
in Citizens United emphasized that distinction. 
Fifth, the Court did not allow corporations to drown out 
democracy. There has been a mischievous campaign of 
misinformation on this issue to convey the impression that the Court 
decision would—and did—unleash an “avalanche” of corporate 
spending to swamp democracy. As we all know, corporations have 
been free in half the states to do what the Court now said the 
Constitution permits them to do, and there was barely a ripple, let 
alone an avalanche. At the federal level, corporations were free in 
2008 to attack Senator Obama fiercely, so long as they did not 
engage in the “functional equivalent of express advocacy.” Yet there 
were almost no such ads. Close to zero. Speaking of zero, the Target 
Company can tell you how easy it has been for corporations to take 
advantage of the Citizens United ruling and take over our politics. 
And as the dust settles on last fall’s congressional elections, we are 
starting to learn that Democrats maintained a funding edge over 
Republicans and that outside groups did not seem to make a 
difference in most competitive districts.63 The avalanche that swept 
                                                                                                                 
 63. See Michael Luo & Griff Palmer, For Democrats, Financial Edge in Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 27, 2010, at A1. The highly respected and truly non-partisan Campaign Finance Institute reported 
that the sharply increased independent spending in the 2010 elections “did not dictate the results.” See 
Press Release, Campaign Fin. Inst., Non-Party Spending Doubled in 2010 but Did Not Dictate the 
Results (Nov. 5, 2010), available at http://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/10-11-05/Non-
Party_Spending_Doubled_But_Did_Not_Dictate_Results.aspx [hereinafter CFI]. Likewise, a study of 
money spent on advertising by the top outside groups, most of it spent in supporting Republican 
candidates, shows that last year did not represent a significant increase in the proportion of such 
spending as part of overall campaign spending compared to prior elections. See Alex Isenstadt, Study 
Downplays Outside Groups’ Power, POLITICO, Jan. 13, 2011, 
http://politico.com/news/stories/0111/47589.html (referring to a Wesleyan University study of 
advertising and noting that the report “rebuts the widely-held belief that Republicans vastly outspent 
Democrats on the airwaves”). 
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the Democrats out of office at the federal and state levels was not 
made of corporate cash.  
Sixth, the Court did not allow secret, corporate slush funds to 
contaminate our politics free from any public scrutiny. On the 
contrary. The undisclosed First Amendment story of this past 
Supreme Court term, I am saddened to report, is that the Court, save 
for the valiant Justice Clarence Thomas, has thrown associational 
privacy and political anonymity under the bus. In the din of 
disapproval of the Citizens United decision, one understandably may 
not have noticed that the Court did, in fact, uphold relatively intrusive 
disclaimer and disclosure requirements on the speech and speakers 
that it just freed from prohibition. And the disclosures upheld went 
well beyond what groups like the ACLU thought were justified and 
what the Buckley case had allowed. In that case, the Court clearly 
held that the only independent speech that could be subject to any 
forms of registration or disclosure was that which expressly 
advocated the election or defeat of a federal candidate. Too narrow, 
said eight of the nine Justices in Citizens United. Now, any person or 
group that even mentions a politician in an election-season broadcast 
advertisement, regardless of the context or thrust of the ad, is subject 
to the statute’s disclosure regime. Indeed, Justice Kennedy was quite 
explicit that one of the reasons why it would not be dangerous to 
democracy to let corporations and unions have full speech rights 
concerning candidates and politics was that, for the first time, there 
would be disclosure as well:  
A campaign finance system that pairs corporate independent 
expenditures with effective disclosure has not existed before 
today. . . . The First Amendment protects political speech; and 
disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the 
speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This transparency 
enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give 
proper weight to different speakers and messages.64  
                                                                                                                 
 64. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010).  
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Muted was any significant appreciation of the chilling effect that 
disclosure can have, even apart from those groups that can show 
specific threats of harassment of their members and supporters.65 
Nor, lastly, did the Court rule that corporations are people. It did 
rule that corporations formed by people, like other organizations 
formed by people—the Georgia State University College of Law 
comes happily to mind—cannot be denied First Amendment rights. 
We have understood this for a century. It should have come as no big 
surprise. Indeed, in the modern age, when the soap-box orator of an 
earlier era will have a hard time making himself or herself heard 
above the roar of the crowd, the protection of group rights is critical 
to the effectuation of individual rights. The Supreme Court majority 
understood this well, and for that all of us individuals, who comprise 
We the People, should be grateful.  
V.  THE AFTERMATH 
In my view, the President, the media, and the leaders of Congress 
did not acquit themselves admirably in the wake of the Court’s 
decision.  
First, the President. The day of the decision, and particularly again 
a week later, during his State of the Union address, he directly 
attacked the Supreme Court over the decision, an attack which was 
                                                                                                                 
 65. That same embrace of disclosure and transparency also led to the result in Doe v. Reed, 130 S. 
Ct. 2811 (2010), where the widespread public disclosure of the identities—names and addresses—of 
people who signed petitions to put what was perceived to be an anti-gay referendum on the ballot was 
approved by the Court, with only Justice Thomas dissenting in favor of political privacy, though Justice 
Alito did suggest that a door should be kept open for as-applied harassment challenges. But the 
overwhelming majority of the Court supported public disclosure and denigrated the privacy concerns. 
While there were a number of arguably sound legal grounds for the result—signing the petition is a 
public act; many referenda are not particularly controversial and don’t require protection of privacy; 
electoral fraud needs to be discouraged—arguably what was really going on was a campaign to expose 
and intimidate people who politically opposed same-sex marriage. Though not extremely widespread, 
there had been enough incidents in different parts of the country to raise a concern about the effects of 
disclosure, but the majority brushed it aside. At least we still have the secret ballot. 
  For a general critique of the efficacy of disclosure to combat corruption, see Bruce Cain, 
Disclosure and Corruption Revisited, The Conversation, November 1, 2010, Cato Unbound, available at 
http://www.cato-unbound.org/2010/11/19/bruce-cain/disclosure-and-corruption-revisited. For a 
powerful description of the anti-challenger, pro-incumbent harms of disclosure, see James L. Huffman, 
How Donor Disclosure Hurts Democracy, WALL ST. J., April 11, 2011, at A13. 
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unprecedented in the history of Presidential–Court relations. With all 
due respect, the President, a former constitutional law professor, 
should have thought carefully before misrepresenting the Supreme 
Court decision—even the New York Times said he did so—and for 
his extraordinary attack on the Supreme Court, both in his press 
conference the day of the decision and in his unprecedented diatribe 
against the Court, as the Justices had to sit there silently during his 
State of the Union address, unable to respond. No one can remember 
a President treating the Supreme Court Justices so disrespectfully and 
to their faces, knowing they could not respond—except for Justice 
Alito’s apparent quiet disagreement, “that’s not true”—and knowing 
that his remarks would cause the Democrats to give a standing 
ovation to his attack on the Court’s decision and almost wave their 
fists in the faces of the Justices. Imagine if a Republican President 
had attacked the sitting Justices like that in front of a Republican-
controlled Congress after the Court had just handed down a decision 
protecting the rights of detainees at Guantanamo, and said that the 
decision would result in Americans dying at the hands of freed 
terrorists. The press would have roundly condemned the President for 
undermining the independence of the judiciary. Yet, in President 
Obama’s case there was very little outcry.  
Second, perhaps the press gave the President a pass because most 
of the press agreed with him about the Court’s decision. It still passes 
my understanding, though, how a decision which says that the power 
of Congress to regulate corporate speech could not be accepted 
because then Congress would be empowered to regulate the corporate 
news media could be so attacked by the media whose rights were 
reaffirmed by the Court. Either the press really believes that they 
have special rights under the First Amendment, which other 
institutions lack, a superiority that the Supreme Court has 
consistently rejected, or they do not want the competition in the 
market place of ideas from other business corporations. Neither 
possibility is very flattering to the press. 
Finally, the Congressional response to the Court’s decision, 
beyond the disgraceful performance at the State of the Union, was 
equally troubling. Congressional leaders immediately announced 
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their condemnation of the Court’s decision and their intent to pass 
legislation to “blunt” the impact of the decision and figure out 
various ways to “get around” the Court’s ruling. Some proposed a 
constitutional amendment that would give government broad power 
to regulate campaign expenditures or to regulate corporate speech. 
Most legislative reaction coalesced around the proposed, so-called 
DISCLOSE Act, a catchy acronym standing for Democracy is 
Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending on Elections.66 A critic 
suggested that DISCLOSE really stood for “Democratic Incumbents 
Seeking to Contain Losses by Outlawing Speech in Elections.”67  
In its various incarnations, the bill would have expanded 
government regulation of political funding well beyond current law 
and well beyond any valid response to the Court’s decision or 
anything authorized by that decision. In an unseemly burst of 
nativism and xenophobia, American corporations with any significant 
foreign stock ownership would be banned from exercising their 
Citizens United free speech rights. Federal government contractors 
would likewise be banned from exercising those rights if they wanted 
to keep their government contracts, in a questionable mandatory 
tradeoff of government contracts for First Amendment rights, and 
even affecting groups like Planned Parenthood which receive 
government funding. Under one proposal, any company that 
employed a registered lobbyist would be barred from exercising its 
Citizens United rights. Labor unions, however, were exempt from 
many of these restrictions and coercions, and so was the National 
Rifle Association, in a political deal that drew widespread 
condemnation as a cynical maneuver to gather more votes for the bill. 
Extremely expanded and burdensome shareholder approval 
requirements were proposed that, as a practical matter, would prevent 
most such corporations from exercising their rights. The same was 
true of enhanced disclosure and “stand by your ad” requirements, 
which would mandate that top corporate—but not union—officials 
                                                                                                                 
 66. See S. 3628, 111th Cong. (2010).  
 67. The quote is from Bradley Smith, and it is referenced in several places. See, e.g., George F. Will, 
Editorial, Putting the Clamps on Free Speech, WASH. POST, July 11, 2010, at A17. 
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appear personally in any broadcast ads, that the five top donors to a 
group be identified in the ads, and that disclosure of supporters be 
accelerated and intensified.68 Indeed, some of these proposals were 
so objectionable that liberal groups like the Sierra Club and the 
Alliance for Justice condemned the requirements as threatening 
disclosure of their key supporters.  
All of this seemed like exactly what the Supreme Court warned 
against, namely, the manipulation of campaign finance rules for 
partisan political advantage. In this instance it was a clear effort by 
Democrats to mute the corporate voices they feared would be raised 
on behalf of Republicans in the fall elections. Indeed, unlike any 
other piece of federal campaign finance regulation, this law would 
have been effective immediately, rather than waiting for one election 
cycle before taking effect. The bill was unsuccessful because all 
Republicans were united against it, and the Democrats threatened to 
bring it up again during last winter’s lame-duck session of Congress, 
but that did not materialize. But pushing for a revised version of 
DISCLOSE is high on the list of campaign finance pro-regulatory 
groups and the Democratic leadership in Congress.  
Meanwhile, what has happened outside of Washington? Well what 
did not happen was the feared avalanche of special interest corporate 
money polluting our politics. To be sure, there was a good deal of 
campaign spending, because this was such a heated election, and 
there was a lot of money spent on independent ads for or against 
candidates in hotly-contested races, some of which originated with 
corporations. But the onslaught of corporate money simply failed to 
materialize, and preliminary reports of spending, as evaluated by 
independent groups without a political ax to grind, have shown little 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Under various proposals, 501(c)(4) advocacy organizations, which presently do not have publicly 
to disclose their donors, would be required to do so if they sponsored advertisements that related to 
political candidates. This would have a wide-ranging effect on groups like the ACLU, the NAACP, and 
the myriad of cause organizations that are formed under that provision of the tax code and frequently 
engage in “educational” campaigns with a clear political impact. During the 2000 presidential elections, 
for example, the NAACP ran an extensive nationwide ad campaign attacking then-Governor George 
Bush on race issues. The ads were apparently funded by wealthy supporters who were able to remain 
anonymous but would not under the proposed legislation. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 
U.S. 93, 175 n.68 (2003). See generally Elizabeth Wasserman, Non-profits Walk Fine Line On Political 
Activity, MSNBC, July 25, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25838144/ns/us_news-giving.  
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evidence of corporate domination or anything close to that.69 Despite 
the high stakes and high passions of this election season, there has 
been no dramatic increase in corporate—or union—spending for 
political speech. What has happened is that some corporations 
exercising their long-standing rights under relevant state law to spend 
money on politics have seen a pressure group backlash against some 
of that spending. Target’s experience in Minnesota is exhibit A. 
Indeed, there are built-in powerful restraints on the ability of 
corporations to use their Citizens United rights extensively, namely, 
the fact that their customers or clients are Republicans and 
Democrats and Independents. Active political involvement is likely 
to anger significant business constituencies, as has been the case.  
VI.  THE FUTURE OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE JURISPRUDENCE   
The Citizen United dissenters, the academic critics of the decision, 
and the political figures who attacked it immediately and furiously 
leveled various charges against the Court’s ruling, both in terms of 
the reasoning of it and the implications flowing from it. Academic 
criticism has included the prominent charge of incoherence: the 
contention that the Court’s seeming absolutist rhetoric and reasoning 
will either have to be carried to logically and politically unacceptable 
extremes or cabined in unprincipled ways that will continue to make 
the law incoherent.70 But I think much of this criticism has an 
incoherence and a cognitive dissonance of its own, and is often 
inconsistent with views of the critics on other issues. 
One charge of potential incoherence is that the decision is in 
tension with the settled rule that contributions can be limited in 
amount and source. Either the Court will have to back off some of its 
broad statements in Citizens United to avoid eroding these other 
settled campaign finance limitations, thus feeding the tension and 
incoherence, or the Court will follow the logic of its deregulatory 
approach and dismantle those remaining restrictions, with a resulting 
                                                                                                                 
 69. See CFI, supra note 64; Isenstadt, supra note 64. 
 70. See Hasen, supra note 42.  
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political firestorm of protest against the Court. Of course, the original 
incoherence was Buckley’s artificial division between contributions 
and expenditures, rejecting the perfectly sensible argument that they 
are “two sides of the same First Amendment coin,” as Chief Justice 
Burger put it in his partial dissent.71The Buckley majority rejected the 
argument that effective disclosure and laws against bribery and 
conflict of interest would be sufficient antidotes to the corruption 
potential of large contributions. And the Court has clung to the 
expenditure free/contributions limited distinction ever since.72  
But the campaign finance system has suffered a great deal from 
this regime, which favored incumbents and special interests and 
encouraged circumventions such as soft money. If Citizens United 
helps a future Court, or perhaps a future Congress, see the folly of the 
continued distinction, and realize that a regime of unlimited 
independent speech—as powerfully protected and vital as that is—
creates disparities with limited candidate- and party-funded speech, 
then a pro-free speech coherence will indeed be achieved. Indeed, 
speaking of incoherence, the campaign finance regime we have been 
living under for the last forty years, with its byzantine rules and 
regulations and IRS-like complexity, its stratification of speech rights 
in tax-code-like categories, and its provisions and exceptions and 
exceptions to the exceptions and safe harbors—all regulating political 
speech at the core of the First Amendment—should be on any Top 
Ten list of incoherent systems. As the Court pointedly noted in 
Citizens United, you should not need a campaign finance lawyer to 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 241 (1976) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The case brought together 
James L. Buckley, a conservative Republican, and Eugene McCarthy, a liberal Democrat. Both had 
achieved stunning political upsets by being able to raise and spend the funds necessary to get their 
insurgent messages out. But Congress thereafter imposed limits on political contributions and spending 
(through amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971) that would have made it 
impossible for them to run similar outsider campaigns in the future. The Court upheld limits on 
contributions, because of a concern with the potential for corruption. But it ruled that limits on what 
individuals and groups could spend to get their own political messages out violated the First 
Amendment. Today, on the Court, only Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, has squarely called for 
overruling Buckley’s artificial distinction and called for an end to limitations on contributions. See 
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 410–29 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 72. The Court has ruled, however, that contribution limits set so low that they make it impractical to 
raise enough money to mount an effective campaign violate the First Amendment. See Randall v. 
Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006). 
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exercise your right of free speech.73 The regulatory regime required 
speakers to run a maze of questions: Who or what are you? What are 
you planning to say? When are you planning to say it? What medium 
are you planning to say it in? Oh, and why are you planning to say it? 
While the Court did not sweep away all of those distinctions and 
achieve a perfectly unitary system of free speech where every person 
or group gets to say whatever they want about any politician or issue 
at any time of the year and in any medium and using whatever 
amount of resources they see fit, the decision got us significantly 
closer to that First Amendment nirvana than we were before.  
The second charge of incoherence is that the Court’s logic will 
either lead to opening the door to foreign financial intervention in our 
election campaigns, or keep that door shut by ignoring, in an 
incoherent and unprincipled way, some of the implications of the 
Citizens United ruling to the effect that the protection of speech 
cannot be made to turn on its source. In the views of dissenting 
Justices and thoughtful academics, this contention is worth 
considering. But in the hands of political figures, it has become 
almost a demagogic campaign with tones of nativism and 
isolationism that rarely emanate from the liberal end of the political 
spectrum. Of course, President Obama set the tone for that 
demagoguery by calling out the Justices at the State of the Union 
days after the decision and attacking them for “open[ing] the 
floodgates for special interests—including foreign corporations—to 
spend without limit in our elections.” He further stated, “I don’t think 
our elections should be bankrolled by America’s most powerful 
interests, or worse, by foreign entities.” This in the face of the 
Court’s having explicitly noted that issues of foreign individual or 
corporate funding in American elections—prohibited by statute—
were not before the Court or being resolved. This set the tone for the 
demagoguery of so many political figures for the duration of the 2010 
campaign.74 And again what is so telling about the use of the “foreign 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 889 (2010).  
 74. Perhaps the low point was the effort to paint the Chamber of Commerce with a “foreign” brush 
with wildly inflated charges of secret foreign money just because many of its dues-paying members are 
corporations from other countries, as is true for hundreds of organizations and labor unions. It 
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influence” card is that it was being done by politicians who are 
normally the strongest supporters of foreign immigration and who 
label as nativists or isolationists or worse those politically opposed to 
such immigration. It was almost as if someone were going to propose 
a Smoot-Hawley Tariff against foreign funding of free speech, or 
erect a Free Speech Iron Curtain to keep that alien or foreign speech 
from invading our shores.  
On the Court, a similar cognitive dissonance was apparent on this 
issue. It seems surprising that the liberal members of the Court also 
wanted to put up a First Amendment Iron Curtain to keep foreign 
ideas and their funding from darkening our shores. Normally, one 
would expect conservatives to strike such an isolationist, nativist 
stance. The liberal Justices want to extend the Constitution around 
the world, and certainly to Guantanamo, and would presumably reject 
restrictions on the import of foreign ideas, and indeed, would even let 
Americans help support terrorist organizations—or at least the non-
violent work of such organizations75—yet do not want to allow 
foreign organizations to fund political ideas in America. Liberal 
Justices of an earlier era, like Black, Douglas and Brennan, opposed 
the xenophobic rejection of ideas coming from abroad, and, indeed, 
struck down a statute which simply required notifying the 
government that you wanted to receive foreign communist 
government propaganda.76 They said that we should not put up a First 
Amendment Iron Curtain against foreign ideas, and that Americans 
who wanted to hear those ideas had a constitutional right to do so. 
Liberal organizations have long opposed “ideological exclusion” of 
foreign speakers and visitors from America77 and prominent leaders 
                                                                                                                 
culminated in an exchange between CBS News’ Bob Schieffer and President Obama’s campaign 
strategist, David Axelrod. When Schieffer pressed Axelrod on whether he had any proof that the 
Chamber was guilty of funneling foreign money into the 2010 elections, his response was “Do you have 
any evidence that it’s not, Bob?” Schieffer’s response was telling: “Is that the best you can do?” See 
Schieffer Smacks Down Axelrod’s Foreign Money Accusation, FACE THE NATION, CBS, Oct. 10, 2010, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=6944932n. 
 75. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
 76. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. of the United States, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
 77. See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2009); Attorney Gen. of 
the United States v. Irish People, Inc., 796 F.2d 520 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 
465 (1987).  
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of such groups have written eloquently in opposition to a “nylon 
curtain” to keep out foreign ideas and influences from the American 
debate.78 What has changed? The fact that the ideas may be 
conservative, not liberal? Pro-business and not pro-union?  
The Justices waving the red flag of foreign influence were the 
members of the Court’s liberal wing, which normally supports 
immigration, cosmopolitanism, interaction with the world, and even 
the controversial issue of looking to and considering foreign law as 
part of their judicial deliberations.79 Yet these internationalists were 
quick to condemn the majority for the fact that the decision might 
lead to foreign groups or individuals funding speech regarding 
American political campaigns, and academic critics of the decision 
have followed suit.  
Does the Court’s decision open the door to foreign funding of our 
political campaigns, and is that something to be avoided at all costs 
and which the Court will avoid even if it has to act in an unprincipled 
and incoherent way? 
Current law prohibits any foreign national from making any 
contributions or expenditures with respect to a federal election, but 
permits a wide range of other First Amendment political activity.80 
Critics of Citizens United ask whether its principles can or should 
allow a Saudi oil company to spend a billion dollars advocating in an 
American political campaign. Let me start from the other end of the 
hypothetical spectrum. Would we ban a visitor from Saudi Arabia, 
here on a tourist visa, from buying a loudspeaker and giving a speech 
on a street corner praising President Obama’s quest for peace in the 
Middle East? From paying to print up and then hand out leaflets on 
the same street corner containing the same message? Would it matter 
if the tourist’s speech were funded by a foreign labor union or non-
profit organization or even business corporation? If we are not 
                                                                                                                 
 78. See Burt Neuborne & Steven R. Shapiro, The Nylon Curtain: America’s National Border and the 
Free Flow of Ideas, 26 WM & MARY L. REV. 719 (1985). 
 79. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 80. 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a) (2006) (prohibiting “foreign nationals” from making contributions or 
expenditures). See generally, Toni M. Massaro, Foreign Nationals, Election Speech and the First 
Amendment, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1682202.  
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willing to prohibit that foreign speech or those foreign leaflets about 
American politics and elections, then why are we not willing to allow 
foreign entities to uses resources to speak out on American political 
issues and candidates on the same terms as any American person or 
entity?81  
Speaking of soap box orators, it is the liberal dissenters, not the 
conservative majority, that seem to take almost a primitive, atomistic, 
eighteenth-century view of the purpose and beneficiaries of the First 
Amendment’s protections. Their model for First Amendment poster 
person is the lonely pamphleteer, the soapbox orator, the individual 
railing against the system. That is certainly an important image of 
First Amendment iconography, but it is an image that needs to be 
updated for the twenty-first century when, despite the great boon to 
individual speech provided by the Internet, most of us need to 
associate ourselves with entities to amplify our individual voices and 
have them heard. Political parties, advocacy groups, organizations, 
labor unions, corporations—they are the vehicles through which the 
individuals who are associated with them can press their common 
cause more effectively. Mrs. McIntyre and her self-printed leaflets;82 
Mr. Gilleo and his hand-made lawn sign;83 the pajama-clad 
blogger;84 all are vital cogs in the First Amendment system and 
certainly favorites of Justice Stevens. But individuals like David 
Koch and George Soros, and the organizations they fund, give voice 
to hundreds and thousands of individual supporters as well, as do 
business corporations and labor unions, whose free speech rights 
                                                                                                                 
 81. At least one scholar has said that the First Amendment case for permitting foreign contributions 
and expenditures in American campaigns is a very strong one, though she doubts whether the Court will 
be willing to take the political heat to rule to that effect. See Massaro, supra note 81. We may learn the 
answer to some of these questions sooner rather than later since a three-judge court in Washington is 
considering a constitutional challenge to the ban on foreign contributions to American candidates on 
behalf of two people lawfully, but temporarily, in the United States on visas, who want to participate in 
the debate on political issues by making modest contributions to favored federal candidates. See Bluman 
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 10-1766 (RMU), 2011 WL 52561 (D.D.C. Jan. 7, 2011) (granting in part 
plaintiff’s application for a three-judge court).  
 82. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
 83. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994). 
 84. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
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were enhanced by the Court’s decision.85 The First Amendment 
should apply with equal vigor in all of these settings to keep 
government from setting the terms and conditions of public debate 
about the wisdom of what government is doing.  
That was the teaching that animated the Buckley decision—where 
the Court said: “In the free society ordained by our Constitution, it is 
not the government but the people—individually as citizens and 
candidates and collectively as associations and political 
committees—who must retain control over the quantity and range of 
debate on public issues in a political campaign.”86 That was the 
teaching that animated the Citizens United decision as well. The 
dissenters usually are associated with notions of “a living 
constitution” yet here they seem to want the protections of free 
speech frozen in time in the eighteenth century and only available to 
those people who are its twenty-first century counterparts.87 
There is one other example of incoherence and cognitive 
dissonance, which was manifest by all but one Justice on the Court, 
namely, the question of deference to Congress when interference with 
First Amendment rights is concerned.  
In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,88 decided the same Term 
as Citizens United, the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge 
to a federal statute barring “material support” to designated foreign 
terrorist groups, including “coordinated” speech and advocacy on 
                                                                                                                 
 85. The ACLU recently announced that it had raised over $400 million as part of its ninetieth 
anniversary campaign, much of which one has to assume came from rich individuals, foundations, 
perhaps some business and corporations, and $100 of which came from this author. All that funding 
helped amplify my voice considerably beyond what it would have been had I spent the money on 
leaflets and handed them out on my street corner.  
 86. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976).  
 87. Here too there was an interesting switch of positions, with the liberal dissenters emphasizing 
their claim that the Framers would not have intended including corporations or other organizations 
within the protections of the First Amendment, see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 
876, 948–52 (2010), although in many other controversial constitutional law areas they are not usually 
associated with originalism, but with more open-ended notions of a living constitution. In any event, the 
originalist response was that the Framers were aware of corporations, especially educational and 
religious ones, used to advocate different positions, and, more broadly, that the Framers certainly did not 
intend a system where government would paternalistically intervene in political speech and control its 
contours. Id. at 925–29 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 88. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).  
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behalf of such groups, even though the advocacy would otherwise be 
entirely peaceful and lawful. 
There is a real tension between the Holder case, which upheld a 
statute restricting “material support” for protected speech, and 
Citizens United which struck down a statute restricting “material 
support,” so to speak, for political speech by corporations and unions. 
I tell my students, only half jokingly, that the moral of the story is (1) 
that the conservatives will protect speech for corporations, but not for 
terrorists, (2) the liberals will protect speech for terrorists, but not for 
corporations, and (3) Justice Stevens will protect speech for nobody, 
since he was the only Justice to reject the First Amendment claims in 
both cases. I then tell my students that maybe Al Qaeda should 
incorporate and gain protection in the Supreme Court by a vote of 8–
1. Of course, the cases are more nuanced than that, but I am a bit 
appalled by the self-contradictory inconsistencies in approaches, 
especially, inter alia, on the question of deference to Congress and 
the President. The liberals give Congress the benefit of the doubt on 
regulating campaign speech, but not regulating terrorists, and the 
conservatives do vice versa. Were I the tenth Justice, I would say that 
deference is no more appropriate—and just as pernicious—in the 
Pentagon Papers89 case as in Buckley v. Valeo, in Holder as in 
Citizens United. The one constant is the government’s self-interest in 
protecting itself or its secrets, and the courts should be willing to call 
the government on it. I have not the slightest doubt that Justices 
Black and Douglas would have easily invalidated both statutes. 
Instead, you have the specter of Justice Breyer dissenting in Holder 
saying the activities at issue “involve the communication and 
advocacy of political ideas and means of achieving political ends” 
and continuing, that “this speech and association for political 
purposes is the kind of activity to which the First Amendment 
ordinarily offers its strongest protection.” If that does not also 
describe Citizens United, in which he rejected the First Amendment 
claim, then what does. 
                                                                                                                 
 89. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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My hope is, however, that Holder will be distinguished in the 
future as a national security case, without a spillover effect on First 
Amendment claims and issues more generally. But there is definitely 
an underlying tension between the two cases that may erupt in the 
future.  
CONCLUSION: THE MORAL OF THE STORY 
Of course, only time will tell what the real impact of the Citizens 
United decision will be, either doctrinally, practically or politically. 
But, whatever results, to me the case is a landmark of political 
freedom. It has already changed the campaign finance conversation 
away from limits and toward issues like disclosure, public subsidies, 
plus further deregulation of the limits on political funding. The 
decision will lead to increased political speech, a more informed 
electorate, and a more robust democracy. A win, win, win situation 
The ultimate essence of the Court’s ruling is that under the First 
Amendment there are no privileged speakers and no pariah speakers. 
The First Amendment protects all those individuals and groups that 
would exercise their right to speak and communicate by disabling 
government from abridging the freedom of speech. That is a true 
form of leveling the playing field, putting all people and groups on 
the same plane and footing where freedom of speech is concerned. 
Most of the press does not like the decision because they do not want 
the competition; most of the politicians do not like the decision 
because they do not want the criticism and the pushback. But the 
competition and the criticism will inevitably work to the benefit of 
the public and the political process, and ultimately, to the strength of 
our democracy.  
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